Christina Knapp v. U.S. Department of HHS by unknown
2020 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-10-2020 
Christina Knapp v. U.S. Department of HHS 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020 
Recommended Citation 
"Christina Knapp v. U.S. Department of HHS" (2020). 2020 Decisions. 1039. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020/1039 
This November is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in 2020 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






CHRISTINA KNAPP; DOUGLASS KNAPP, 








On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 3-18-cv-01422) 
District Judge:  Honorable Malachy E. Mannion 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 








This matter comes on before this Court on the appeal of Plaintiff-Appellants 
Christina Knapp (“Ms. Knapp”) and her husband, Douglas Knapp.  Appellants appeal 
from the District Court’s February 28, 2020 order, granting summary judgment to the 
United States (hereinafter, the “Government”) as it concluded that Appellants’ claim was 
time-barred.1  We will affirm substantially for the reasons the District Court set forth in 
its opinion granting summary judgment but nevertheless make some comments of our 
own. 
 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
This appeal arises from allegations of medical malpractice that Appellants raised 
arising from Ms. Knapp’s care and treatment at the Pike County, Pennsylvania, Family 
Health Center (the “Pike County Health Center”) in Hawley, Pennsylvania, by its 
employee, Eileen Arenson, C.R.N.P.  We see no need to set forth the far-reaching 
consequences of the allegedly negligent treatment but we recite the significant facts of 
the case germane to this opinion which essentially are procedural and are not in dispute.  
Appellants state that Ms. Knapp first became aware of the circumstances that led to this 
action on July 15, 2015, a date that the Government does not challenge. 
 
1 We refer to the Knapp claims in the singular as a claim. 
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On May 26, 2017, Appellants initiated an action against the Pike County Health 
Center and Ms. Arenson separate from this action in the Court of Common Pleas of Pike 
County that is still pending.  On June 23, 2017, the Pike County Health Center advised 
Appellants that it was a recipient of federal funding and therefore any tort claim against it 
was required to be made pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).2  On June 
28, 2017, because they had become aware of the federal aspects of this case, Appellants 
faxed and hand delivered an SF-95 administrative tort claim form (hereinafter referred to 
as an “SF-95”) to the Pike County Health Center.  Ms. Arenson came into possession of 
the SF-95 by July 18, 2017, and on July 19, 2017, she forwarded the SF-95 to an 
employee at the Wayne Memorial Community Health Center (“WMCHC”), which is the 
operator of the Pike County Health Center.  On the same day the WMCHC emailed the 
SF-95 to the United States Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”).  Thus, 
HHS received the SF-95 on July 19, 2017.   
On July 17, 2018, Appellants commenced this action in the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania naming HHS as Defendant.  Appellants explain that they initiated the 
action because six months had passed since the SF-95 had been sent to the Pike County 
Health Center and HHS had neither accepted nor rejected their claim.  (See Appellants’ 
 
2 The Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act (“FSHCAA”) provides that 
employees of certain qualifying grant recipients should be “deemed to be an employee of 
the Public Health Service” for purposes of the Public Health Services Act, which protects 
Public Health Service employees from personal liability resulting from performing their 
official duties.  See 42 U.S.C. § 233(a)-(g).  Further, the FSHCAA provides that an 
FTCA claim is the exclusive remedy for a medical negligence claim against the United 
States.  See 42 U.S.C. § 233(g)(1)(A). 
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Opening Br. 5.)  The six-month period is significant because a claimant may treat the 
passing of six months after he or she files a claim under the FTCA without the agency 
disposing of the claim as a rejection of the claim.  The Government responded to the 
action by filing a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, arguing 
Appellants’ claim was time-barred.  Appellants sought an opportunity for discovery, but 
the District Court would not allow that as it believed it would not lead to the discovery of 
facts to save this case.  The District Court granted the Government’s motion for summary 




We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, Cranbury Brick 
Yard, LLC v. United States, 943 F.3d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 2019), but we review a district 
court’s decision to deny a litigant the opportunity to take discovery for abuse of 
discretion.  ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 268 (3d Cir. 2012). 
“As a sovereign, the United States is immune from suit unless it consents to be 
sued.”  White-Squire v. U. S. Postal Serv., 592 F.3d 453, 456 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 
United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538, 100 S. Ct. 1349 (1980)).  That consent 
“must be unequivocally expressed, and the terms of such consent define the court’s 
subject matter jurisdiction.”  Id.  (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Mitchell, 445 
U.S. at 538).  The FTCA includes a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, which 
provides, in part, the following: 
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An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the 
United States for money damages for . . . personal 
injury . . . unless the claimant shall have first presented the 
claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his [or her] claim 
shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent 
by certified or registered mail.  The failure of an agency to 
make final disposition of a claim within six months after it is 
filed shall, at the option of the claimant any time thereafter, be 
deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this 
section . . . . 
 
28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); see also White-Squire, 592 F.3d at 457.   
The applicable statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), provides that a claimant 
must present his or her tort claim against the United States “in writing to the appropriate 
Federal agency within two years after [the] claim accrues” or it “shall be forever 
barred[.]”  The tort claim accrues “when a plaintiff knows of both the existence and the 
cause of [the] injury.”  Miller v. Phila. Geriatric Ctr., 463 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 2006).  
Claimants, therefore, are required to exhaust their administrative remedies before they 
can initiate a suit in federal court, and “the requirement that the appropriate [F]ederal 
agency act on a claim before suit can be brought is jurisdictional and cannot be waived.”  
Roma v. United States, 344 F.3d 352, 362 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); see also 
McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113 S. Ct. 1980 (1993).   
Applying these principles, Appellants’ claim accrued on July 15, 2015, and, 
therefore, they were required to present the SF-95 to HHS—the appropriate Federal 
agency—by July 17, 2017.3  HHS did not receive Appellants’ SF-95 until July 19, 2017, 
 
3 July 15, 2017 fell on a Saturday. 
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a date beyond the two-year time limit for presentation of the claim.  Consequently, in the 
absence of overriding law, Appellants’ claim would be time-barred. 
Appellants argue that their claim can be saved under the Westfall Act, which 
allows claimants who initially file their FTCA claims in the wrong forum and are 
time-barred to save their claims so long as they meet certain requirements.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2679(d)(5).  (See Appellants’ Opening Br. 10-17.)    The Westfall Act’s savings clause 
“saves from being barred by the statute of limitations certain timely claims filed in the 
wrong forum, such as in a state or a federal court rather than with the appropriate 
administrative agency.”  Santos v. United States, 559 F.3d. 189, 193 (3d Cir. 2009).  
Therefore, the “plaintiff whose suit is removed to a district court, and then dismissed 
because [he or] she failed to bring the timely required administrative claim, will be 
credited with the date that [he or] she filed [the] claim in the wrong forum for purposes of 
the FTCA’s statute of limitations.”  Id. at 193-94.   
For the savings clause to apply on the basis that it was timely filed but in a state 
court, as here, plaintiffs must have: (1) filed their state court action within two years of 
the alleged injury; (2) presented their FTCA claim to the correct federal agency within 60 
days of the removal and dismissal of the wrongly filed state court action; and (3) if 
denied by the agency, appealed to a federal district court within six months.  See 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2401(b), 2679(d).  Here, the District Court correctly found Appellants failed to 
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satisfy the second element of this test.4  In fact, as the District Court noted, Appellants 
never presented their claim to any Federal agency; rather, they faxed and hand delivered 
the SF-95 to the Pike County Health Center.  (See Feb. 28, 2020 Op. at 12-13.)  
Moreover, the parties recognize that the original state court action has not been dismissed 
and is still pending.  (See Appellants’ Opening Br. 5; Gov’t Opening Br. 17.)   
Although not critical to its outcome, the District Court appropriately noted that 
Appellants “acknowledge that they were on notice that their action fell under the FTCA 
prior to the deadline to present their SF-95 to HHS.”  (Id. at 13; see also id. (“It was 
incumbent on counsel for [Appellants] to determine the procedural machinations under 
the FTCA and how to properly present [Appellants’] SF-95 to the [correct] federal 
agency within the deadline.”).)  Even with that knowledge, Appellants failed to present 
their claim to the appropriate federal agency, HHS, and their arguments that the Westfall 
Act saves their claim lacks merit.  Accordingly, we will affirm the Court’s February 28, 
2020 order granting the Government’s Motion for Summary Judgment.5   
 
4 The District Court seemed to question whether the Westfall Act could apply to a health 
care center in the circumstances in this case.  But we do not address that issue as 
Appellants failed to meet the savings clause’s basic requirements.    
 
5 Appellants’ argument that the District Court abused its discretion by denying discovery 
lacks merit as Appellants did not file an affidavit or declaration under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 56(d), requesting specific discovery and explaining why it had not been 
obtained previously.    (See Appellants’ Opening Br. 6; Appellee’s Br. 18.)  See Shelton 
v. Blesdoe, 775 F.3d 554, 568 (3d Cir. 2015) (stating that summary judgment may be 
granted if the nonmoving party did not file an adequate affidavit or declaration under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d)); see also Bradley v. United States, 299 F.3d 197, 
207 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining that our circuit favors strict compliance with Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 56 and there is a “strong presumption” against finding constructive 
compliance, which we recognize in only the “most exceptional” circumstances). 
